Iran: how the regime manages to shut down the Internet

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By Léna Jauze

January 26, 2026

1 min

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Crédit : Artin Bakhan

Since January 8, 2026, Iran has once again been almost completely cut off from the Internet — after a brief and very limited reconnection observed on Sunday, January 18. The Cloudflare Radar platform (which tracks global Internet traffic, attacks, and technology trends) indicates that traffic dropped by around 90% in the country. The shutdown comes as a large protest movement has been shaking the country since late December, fueling fears of a crackdown carried out away from public scrutiny.

The regime does not “shut down” the Internet everywhere in the world: it simply prevents Iranians from accessing it. This is made possible by the fact that Iranian Internet service providers and telecom companies are highly centralized and placed under state control.

In Iran, this functions almost like a red button. The state has the legal and technical levers needed to disable international routing. Authorities therefore have the capacity to cut off the access paths through which international Internet traffic flows, or to force it through centralized control points.

By shutting down these points, those in power activate what experts call a "kill switch" — a giant switch that makes it possible to block data exchanges with the rest of the world almost instantly. Websites, messaging services, and social networks then become inaccessible to the local population.

At the same time, some internal services can continue to operate on a closed national network, similar to an intranet. This allows the regime to maintain administrative or surveillance services while cutting citizens off from the outside world.

The shutdown was reinforced by the disabling of mobile phone networks, paralyzing banks, hospitals, and many businesses. Circumvention tools are closely monitored, jammed, and severely repressed, making their use difficult and risky.

This lever is not new: Iranian authorities have already used it during the uprisings of 2019 and 2022. But due to its scale and duration, the current shutdown could be one of the most significant ever implemented in the country.

Reports indicate that protesters and activists have used satellite connections (e.g. Starlink) as a “lifeline” to communicate and send information outside the country despite the blackout. However, the government is also said to have attempted to jam these services. Access remains uneven and risky for users, with frequent interruptions — and no guarantee of stability.

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